UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

3-17-2016

State v. Herod Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43108

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Herod Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43108" (2016). Not Reported. 2315.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2315

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
) No. 43108
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
) Canyon Co. Case No.
v.
) CR-2013-25890
)
DAVID GEORGE HEROD,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
________________________
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CANYON
________________________
HONORABLE JUNEAL C. KERRICK
District Judge
________________________
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho

BEN P. McGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
P. O. Box 2816
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 334-2712

PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case ................................................................................... 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ........................ 1
ISSUE ................................................................................................................... 4
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 5
Herod Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion Because
The Challenged Testimony Was Admissible Evidence Relevant
To Credibility And Not An Inadmissible Opinion That A Witness
Was Telling The Truth ................................................................................ 5
A.

Introduction...................................................................................... 5

B.

Standard Of Review ........................................................................ 6

C.

Nurse Ortega Did Not Provide An Inadmissible Opinion
On The Truth Of T.W.’s And A.M.’s Statements .............................. 6

D.

Any Error Is Necessarily Harmless .................................................. 9

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .............................................................................. 12

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) ......................................................... 9
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) .......................................................... 9
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005) ................................................................. 9
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) ..................................................... 9
Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc.,
150 Idaho 240, 245 P.3d 992 (2010) .......................................................... 6
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999).......................................................... 10
Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115 (2011) ............................................................ 9, 10
State v. Allen, 123 Idaho 880, 85 P.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1993) ................................. 6
State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 301 P.3d 242 (2011) ........................................ 7
State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 966 P.2d 33 (Ct. App. 1998) ............................ 6
State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 878 P.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1994) .............. 8, 9, 11
State v. Critchfield, 153 Idaho 680, 290 P.3d 1272 (Ct. App. 2012)...................... 7
State v. Dutt, 139 Idaho 99, 73 P.3d 112 (Ct. App. 2003) ..................................... 8
State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 760 P.2d 27 (1988) ............................................. 6
State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75, 175 P.3d 764 (2007) .............................................. 6
State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 3 P.3d 535 (Ct. App. 2000) ........................... 6
State v. Lindsey, 115 Idaho 184, 765 P.2d 695 (Ct. App. 1988) ......................... 10
State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 300 P.3d 1046 (2013) ......................................... 6
State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 81 P.3d 1230 (2003) ............................................. 6
State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1992) ...................................... 10

ii

RULES
I.R.E. 702 .............................................................................................................. 6

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
David George Herod appeals from his conviction for two counts of lewd
conduct with a child.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A grand jury indicted Herod on two counts of lewd conduct with a child
involving two victims. (R., pp. 23-24.) The matter proceeded to jury trial. (R.,
148-65.)
At the trial elven-year-old T.W. testified that the second time she slept
over at her best friend

house

father, the Defendant Herod,

“touched [her] on the upper private part … of the body.” (Trial Tr., p. 38, Ls. 311; see also p. 20, Ls. 19-24; p. 27, L. 1 – p. 43, L. 7.) The next time she slept
over Herod touched her under her panties. (Trial Tr., p. 44, L. 1 – p. 51, L. 19.)
On a third occasion Herod “pull[ed] [her] over” and “[made her] touch him” on his
“private part.” (Trial Tr., p. 54, Ls. 18-20; p. 55, Ls. 4-11; see also p. 51, L. 20 –
p. 56, L. 13.)
Eleven-year-old A.M. also testified at the trial. (Trial Tr., p. 305, Ls. 1119.) She slept over at her friend Katelynn’s house several times. (Trial Tr., p.
313, L. 2 – p. 314, L. 7.) On one of those sleepovers A.M. woke up to discover
Katelynn’s father, the Defendant Herod, “touching [her] in [her] private part.” (Tr.,
p. 323, L. 17 – p. 324, L. 14.) He then tried to get her to touch him. (Trial Tr., p.
325, Ls. 13-25.) Another time sleeping over, this time in a tent in the back yard,

1

Herod tried to touch A.M. with a “massager” that she could not see in the dark,
but heard it make a “buzzing” sound. (Trial Tr., p. 327, L. 5 – p. 333, L. 4.)
At the trial the state also called Alisa Ortega, a pediatric nurse practitioner,
as a witness. (Trial Tr., p. 132, Ls. 10-24.) She explained how interviews of
possible

victims of sexual abuse are generally conducted. (Trial Tr., p. 136,

L. 11 – p. 140, L. 20.) Based on her expertise, she testified that factors deemed
important in assessing a child’s statements about sexual abuse include
development and knowledge (Trial Tr., p. 141, L. 6 – p. 143, L. 17);
embarrassment (Trial Tr., p. 143, L. 18 – p. 144, L. 13); and understanding of
ramifications (Trial Tr., p. 144, L. 14 – p. 145, L. 9). She explained delayed
disclosure—where a victim of sexual abuse may not immediately report it or may
withhold events or details due to some of the factors already discussed. (Trial
Tr., p. 145, L. 10 – p. 148, L. 13.) Other considerations in evaluating the child’s
statements include body language (Trial Tr., p. 148, L. 14 – p. 149, L. 4); a
physical examination for signs of abuse and the significance of finding no such
signs (Trial Tr., p. 149, L. 5 – p. 153, L. 2); how much detail the

is able to

use in describing the abuse (Trial Tr., p. 153, Ls. 9-24); the amount of repetition
in descriptions of the abuse (Trial Tr., p. 154, L. 18 – p. 155, L. 5); and
appropriateness of the descriptions based on the child’s development and
knowledge (Trial Tr., p. 155, Ls. 6-23).
Relevant to this appeal, Herod objected to Ortega’s testimony that the
amount of detail an interviewee can provide about the incident would go to
assessing whether the claim of sexual abuse was genuine or fabricated, because
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the testimony went to credibility. (Trial Tr., p. 153, L. 25 – p. 154, L. 4.) The
district court overruled the objection. (Trial Tr., p. 154, L. 9.)
Following trial, the jury found Herod guilty on both counts. (R., pp. 20405.) The district court entered judgment (R., pp. 245-47) and Herod timely filed a
notice of appeal (R., pp. 263-67).
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ISSUE
Herod states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed Ms.
Ortega to testify on how she determined whether an allegation is
false, because her testimony passed upon the credibility of the
complaining witnesses and thereby usurped the jury’s function?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Pediatric nurse practitioner Ortega testified that one factor for evaluating a
child’s statement about having been sexually abused is the child’s ability to recall
details. On appeal Herod claims that this testimony was an inadmissible
comment on the credibility of witnesses. Does Herod’s argument fail because
the challenged testimony was evidence relevant to credibility but was not an
opinion on credibility?
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ARGUMENT
Herod Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion Because The Challenged
Testimony Was Admissible Evidence Relevant To Credibility And Not An
Inadmissible Opinion That A Witness Was Telling The Truth
A.

Introduction
Alisa Ortega, a pediatric nurse practitioner specializing in assessing

sexual abuse, testified about a variety of factors used by her professionally to
determine whether to diagnose

sexual abuse. Relevant here, one of those

factors includes how much detail the

is able to use in describing the abuse,

because a lack of detail may indicate fabrication. (Trial Tr., p. 153, Ls. 9-24.)
Herod objected, claiming this testimony amounted to an improper opinion that the
victims were telling the truth. (Trial Tr., p. 153, L. 25 – p. 154, L. 4.) The
prosecutor responded by pointing out that Nurse Ortega “was not giving an
opinion” as to whether the victims’ statements were true. (Trial Tr., p. 154, Ls. 58.) The district court overruled the objection. (Trial Tr., p. 154, L. 9.)
On appeal Herod argues that Ortega’s testimony “on how she determined
[sic] whether an allegation was false” was inadmissible because it “passed upon
the credibility of witnesses and thereby usurped the jury’s function.” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 8.)

Herod’s argument fails because Nurse Ortega did not offer an

inadmissible opinion on credibility, but instead offered testimony to assist the jury
in making its own credibility determination. Herod’s appellate argument that an
expert may offer no testimony relevant to the jury’s credibility determinations is
without legal merit.
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B.

Standard Of Review
“The determination of whether expert testimony will assist the trier of fact

lies within the broad discretion of the trial court.” State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558,
563, 300 P.3d 1046, 1051 (2013) (quoting Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark,
Inc., 150 Idaho 240, 252, 245 P.3d 992, 1004 (2010)).
C.

Nurse Ortega Did Not Provide An Inadmissible Opinion On The Truth Of
T.W.’s And A.M.’s Statements
“To be admissible, the expert’s testimony must assist the trier of fact to

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” State v. Joslin, 145
Idaho 75, 81, 175 P.3d 764, 770 (2007) (quotations omitted); see also I.R.E. 702.
“The function of the expert is to provide testimony on subjects that are beyond
the common sense, experience and education of the average juror.” State v.
Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 42, 966 P.2d 33, 42 (Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted).
Only where the normal experience of the jurors permits them to draw proper
conclusions from the facts and circumstances are expert conclusions or opinions
inadmissible. Id.
An expert’s testimony is “admissible up to the point where an expression
of opinion would require the expert to pass upon the credibility of witnesses or
the weight of disputed evidence.” State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 525, 81 P.3d
1230, 1235 (2003) (citing State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 696, 760 P.2d 27, 35
(1988); State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 419, 3 P.3d 535, 544 (Ct. App. 2000);
State v. Allen, 123 Idaho 880, 885, 85 P.2d 625, 630 (Ct. App. 1993)). However,
“[o]nly venturing beyond that point would usurp the jury function.”
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State v.

Critchfield, 153 Idaho 680, 684, 290 P.3d 1272, 1276 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus,
while a witness may not opine on the truthfulness of another witness’ statement,
an expert may impart knowledge that will assist the jury to make its own
evaluation. See State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 599-600, 301 P.3d 242, 25758 (2011) (expert opinion helping jury determine reliability of eyewitness
identification admissible); Critchfield, 153 Idaho at 684-85, 290 P.3d at 1276-77
(same).
Nurse Ortega did not “venture beyond [the] point” of “pass[ing] upon the
credibility of witnesses or the weight of disputed evidence.” Rather, she merely
provided many factors she employed when deciding whether to diagnose sexual
abuse. The testimony Herod objected to was as follows:
What sort of things do you look at to determine whether the
Q.
allegation is false?
A.
We look at how much detail the
can give. If they’re not
able to give any detail, well, he did this and that’s it, you know, you
start to question. You know, they’re asked well, you know, how
were your clothes? What were you wearing? If they’re not able to
give any type of detail about how it may have felt or what they
heard or saw or anything like that, you start to question a little bit.
Now, if they’re able to give a lot of detail, well, they were
wearing this, this, and this, I was wearing this, you know, it felt like
this, you know, then you think okay, it’s probably true, probably
plausible.
(Trial Tr., p. 153, Ls. 9-24.) This testimony, while relevant to credibility, was not
an opinion on the credibility of the victims in this case. Like the other factors
Nurse Ortega testified about (such as age, development, physical signs of abuse,
otherwise unexplained knowledge of sexual matters, and an unusual amount of
repetition in describing the alleged abuse), this merely provided assistance to the
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trier of fact in evaluating the victims’ disclosures and statements regarding sexual
abuse.
Herod argues that Nurse Ortega “indirectly vouched for the truth of T.W.’s
and A.M.’s accounts.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)

vouched” is corroborated.

A synonym for “indirectly

Corroboration is not impermissible, however.

No

doubt had the factors Nurse Ortega testified to ultimately run in Herod’s favor,
she would have been a defense witness.
Herod’s “indirectly vouched” argument was effectively rejected by the
Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 21-22, 878 P.2d
188, 195-96 (Ct. App. 1994). In that case the state’s expert testified as to why
many victims delay disclosing sexual abuse. Id. at 22, 878 P.2d at 196. The
defendant argued this testimony “amounted to nothing more than vouching for
the victim’s credibility” when she testified why she delayed disclosing the abuse.
Id. This argument, stated the Court, “overlooks the distinction between testimony
that merely opines as to the victim’s credibility and testimony which corroborates
elements of the victim’s story or aids the jury in evaluating the victim’s
truthfulness.” Id.; see also State v. Dutt, 139 Idaho 99, 104-05, 73 P.3d 112,
117-18 (Ct. App. 2003) (“whether the victim’s conduct in disclosing the details of
her sexual abuse in the present case was consistent with the behavior of other
sexually abused children was a … proper subject of testimony by a qualified
expert”).
Nurse Ortega’s testimony did not vouch, directly or indirectly, for T.W.’s
and A.M.’s testimony. Rather, she provided expert testimony on several factors
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employed by her professionally within her training and experience to evaluate
alleged victims of sexual abuse. Herod’s argument “overlooks the distinction
between testimony that merely opines as to the victim’s credibility and testimony
which corroborates elements of the victim’s story or aids the jury in evaluating the
victim’s truthfulness.” Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 22, 878 P.2d at 96. Because the
testimony was admissible, Herod has failed to show an abuse of discretion.
D.

Any Error Is Necessarily Harmless
A trial error can be declared harmless if the appellate court concludes on

de novo review it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). To show harmless error the state has “the
burden of showing that it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational
jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” Premo v. Moore,
562 U.S. 115, 130 (2011) (internal quotations omitted). Where the error placed
impermissible evidence, argument or information before the jury the Supreme
Court has required the prosecution to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error did not contribute to the conviction. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 (admission of
confession that should have been suppressed); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279, 295-96 (1991) (argument for guilt from defendant’s silence); Deck v.
Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 635 (2005) (visible shackles without cause at jury trial).
An “otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may
confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681

(1986). In conjunction with the review of the whole record, review of the strength
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of the state’s evidence is appropriate. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16-20
(1999); see also Premo, 562 U.S. at 129-31. The analysis ultimately focuses “on
the underlying fairness of the trial.” Neder, 527 U.S. at 18-19.
Even if, despite overwhelming authority to the contrary, this Court should
adopt Herod’s “indirectly vouched” standard and hold inadmissible that portion of
Nurse Ortega’s testimony regarding amount of detail being a consideration in
whether the alleged sexual abuse happened, such error is necessarily harmless.
Certainly the jury, either on its own or upon invitation of either the prosecutor or
defense counsel, could have considered the amount of detail in T.W.’s and
A.M.’s statements and testimony as factors weighing on truth. See, e.g., State v.
Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 181, 845 P.2d 1211, 1214 (1992) (“details and
generalities” proper considerations in jury’s assessment of credibility (internal
citation omitted)); State v. Lindsey, 115 Idaho 184, 186, 765 P.2d 695, 697 (Ct.
App. 1988) (the “precision of detail” provided by an informant properly considered
to support his credibility). Because the jury was already free to consider the
amount of detail provided by the witnesses in assessing their credibility, nothing
in the record indicates that the challenged testimony could have played any
improper role in the verdict.
Equating Nurse Ortega’s testimony to polygraph evidence, Herod argues
that credibility of the victims was of central importance in the case, but offers no
theory on how the jury would have weighed the amount of detail in the victims’
statements differently had the challenged testimony not been presented.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-15.) That Herod equates the challenged testimony to
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polygraph evidence shows that his argument truly “overlooks the distinction
between testimony that merely opines as to the victim’s credibility and testimony
which corroborates elements of the victim’s story or aids the jury in evaluating the
victim’s truthfulness.” Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 22, 878 P.2d at 96. Encouraging
the jury to consider the detail the victims were able (or not able) to provide in
their statements is in no way analogous to claiming they passed polygraphs.
Herod’s reliance on such an inapt analogy shows the weakness of his argument.
Nurse Ortega testified that she considers the child’s ability or inability to
provide detail about the alleged incident of sexual abuse in determining whether
the abuse in fact happened. Although this was admissible testimony, even if it
was not admissible the jury was allowed to consider the presence or absence of
detail in T.W.’s and A.M.’s accounts in judging their credibility.

Thus, the

testimony Herod claims was inadmissible merely invited to the jury to do what it
could have done anyway.

Admission of the challenged testimony had no

possible effect on the jury’s determination of credibility and could therefore have
had no perceivable prejudicial effect on the outcome of the case. Its admission
was, if error, harmless error.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s
judgment.
DATED this 17th day of March, 2016.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of March, 2016, served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
BEN P. McGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

KKJ/dd

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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